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I. Introduction 
2P network have dramatically gain popularity for 
the past few years. P2P are overlay network since 
P2P network runs on top of internet. In a P2P 
network, the peers are computer systems which are 
connected to each other via internet. Files can be 
shared directly between systems on the network without 
the need of a central server. In other words, each 
computer on a P2P network becomes a file server as 
well as a client .The only requirement for a computer to 
join a peer-to-peer network are an internet connection 
and P2P software [1]. Each node can join or leave the 
network at anytime.  
P2P systems are usually designed on the 
assumption that all peers can share their resources 
consciously. P2P is currently receiving considerable 
interest but still there are threats like free riding and 
tragedy of common which are degrading the 
performance of P2P system. Free Riding is not a new 
problem, it has existed in community –sharing based 
fields of human endeavour for centuries. Economist 
have done comprehensive studies on the twin problem 
of free riding and tragedy of Common[2].Hardin [3] 
proved that common resources without any exclusive 
ownership will be consume without limit. He named this 
phenomenon Tragedy of Common.  
A Free rider is a peer that uses the P2P services 
but does not contribute to the network at an acceptable 
level. In [4] authors reported that 70% of peers did not 
share any files at all, and 25% provide 99% of all query 
hits in the network. Self interest of the peer is the main 
cause of free riding. Causes of free-riding are as follows.  
1) Sharing of resources requires usage of bandwidth, 
hard disk space, CPU cycles etc. Therefore a peer 
does not share in order to avoid the usage of these 
things. 
2) Usually peers does not get benefit for sharing 
others, therefore they are not interested in sharing. 
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3) To facilitate digital contents to be downloadable by 
other peers, the computer is required to open 
several ports for such activities. This also opens the 
computer for attacks and viruses [6].  
4) If peers, start sharing popular files. All the download 
request will be directed to those peers. This causes 
overloading the machine and congestion in network. 
According to [5] there are two kinds of free riding  
1) The peers who shared little or no files.  
2) The peers who tend to share fake or unpopular files 
instead of popular to decrease their load.  
Some free riders act in different way than 
others, they don’t contribute to the network as well as 
they don’t forward the query. These types of free riders 
are called Droppers.  
II. Impact of Free Riding 
1) Large number of free riders and their queries will 
generate a large amount of P2P network traffic, 
which may lead to the degradation of P2P service.  
2) The system will not have a large and growing 
number of interesting files. Therefore system will fail 
to attract users.  
3) High level of Free Riding activity increases load on 
the contributor nodes which is not a positive sign for 
P2P network.  
4) Quality of search is degraded due to the increase in 
traffic.   
III. Free Riding Solutions 
Researchers have come up with several 
approaches to combat free riding in P2P network. 
Solutions are used to encourage peers to contribute 
more to the network in order to improve the utility of the 
network. These free riding solutions are further classified 
into the following:  
a) Monetary/Micropayment Based Approach  
In this approach peers are charge for the 
services they receive. Peers have to buy virtual currency 
in order to avail the services. Any monetary –based 
system require two key mechanisms [7].  
i. Accounting Module  
It is used to securely store each peer’s virtual 
currency.  
ii. Settlement Module  
It is used to fairly exchange virtual currency for 
services. A single authority is used to manage each 
peer’s balance and transaction. PKI is used to provide 
P 
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security against fraud and error. In this approach a peer 
is charged for initiating a query and a peer is rewarded 
for every referral.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
1
 
: A referring process involving two agents A 
and B, where A sends Query to B[13]
 
Micropayment approach works in the following way 
 
SCENARIO 1: 
 
When there is only two peer i.e Peer A and Peer 
B.
  
If Peer A initiates a query and Peer B has the answer 
then monetary fund for peer A and peer B will be 
 
Peer A =T-Q 
 
Peer B = T+Q 
 
Where 
 
T is initial monetary fund that peer A and peer B 
have in the beginning.
 
Q is the cost for answer to query. 
 
SCENARIO 2: 
 
When there are three peer i.e Peer A, Peer B 
and Peer C.
  
If Peer A initiates a query and Peer B does not 
has the answer then it will forward the query to Peer C.
 
Monetary fund deducted for peer A , Peer B and peer C 
will be 
 
Peer A =T-Q-R 
 
Peer B = T+R 
 
Peer C= T+Q 
 
Where 
 
R is incremented for referral a query monetary 
approach can be implemented in two ways [7]. 
 
Online Approach: 
 
Exchange of virtual currency takes place at the 
same time as peer receives
 
services. A central authority 
must be present (online) at the time of transaction. 
 
Offline Approach: 
 
If Central Authority
 
(CA) is not present at the 
time of transaction then exchange of service is done and 
payment of virtual currency
 
is executed when the CA is 
available. 
 
b)
 
Reciprocity-Based Approach
  
In reciprocity-based approach [8]
 
[9], a peer 
monitors other peer’s behavior and evaluates their 
contribution level [7]. The quality of service receive by a 
peer depend upon its contribution level. This approach 
usually measure other peer’s contribution only for 
current session, which means a peer judged as 
contributor in one session can be judged as free rider in 
another session. Reciprocity-based approach is further 
classified into two parts [10]. 
 
i.
 
Non Real Time Approach
 
A node collects
 
information about the other 
nodes from their neighbours, trusted third party, local 
information etc. A reputation value of each and every 
node is calculated to determine their performance in the 
past. 
 
ii.
 
Real-Time Reciprocity Approach
  
In this approach, transaction partners evaluate 
each other only at the time of transaction. If a peer is 
consuming a resources from other then it is compulsory 
for a peer to make sources available for other peer. This 
approach is like a barter system. 
 
Reciprocity-based approaches face several 
implementation issues. 
 
1)
 
Peers publish fake services so that they can gain 
higher levels of contribution. 
2)
 
Peers are identified by their values. However, if 
newcomers are assigned a higher standard utility 
value than
 
free riders, a free rider can try to get rid of 
its degraded value by constantly getting a new 
identity. 
 
c)
 
Reputation Based Approach
  
Reputations of the peers are evaluated on the 
basis of feedback receive from the peer who have 
already interacted with that peer. Data is exchanged 
among the peer depending upon their reputation. It is 
assumed
 
that the peers report their interaction honestly. 
Reputations can be positive, negative or both. Services 
are provided to the peer depending upon their 
reputations value. A peer with positive reputation will be 
offered with better service as compared to the peer with 
negative reputations. In this approach, it is not easy to 
convert a bad reputation to good reputation and vice 
versa. Reputations approach is further classified into two 
parts. 
 
i.
 
Autonomous Reputation Approach 
 
It stores the reputation information of only those 
peers’s
 
to whom they have interacted with. 
 
ii.
 
Global Reputation Approach
 
In this approach, average of reputation 
information is
 
obtained from several peers or all peers. 
Average reputation is stored at central location or is 
stored with a set of peers in the network. This approach 
provides long term reputation information about peers 
 
In P2P network some peers are likely to manipulate 
reputation value
 
by forging transaction history. There are 
three main type of such behaviour [11].
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a. Collude Inflating  
A set of peers rates one another with 
satisfactory values for some download that never 
existed or download of fake files. Peers misbehave in 
this manner in order to increase their reputation value.  
b. Deflating  
A set of peers rates one peer with unsatisfactory 
values in order to increase their own reputation value.  
c. Faker  
A peer of low reputation value pretend to act as 
a peer of high reputation value in order to gain the profit 
from the network.  
d) Fixed Contribution  
This approach follows a simple rule: if a node 
wants to join a network, it has to contribute to the 
network. Direct Connect [12] is the example of fixed 
contribution. Contribution to the network consist of 
sharing of files and minimum upload bandwidth 
available. If a user does not upload the requires amount 
of data then it is not allowed to join the network. Fixed 
contribution approach discourages free-riding since in 
this approach it is compulsory to share data and if every 
node is sharing something in network then there is no 
scope of free riders in network. This approach attracts 
many other users since there are many contributors in 
this network.  
The main problem with this approach is that it 
does not check the data which is shared by the joining 
nodes. The user can enter the system by sharing some 
useless files or by sharing the same old file again and 
again. There is no such mechanism to stop such kind of 
activities.  
IV. Conclusion 
In order to deal with free-riding in P2P system, 
different incentive mechanisms are presented in this 
paper that are currently being used. In this paper we 
have presented a survey of free riding solutions while at 
the same time laying down the problems of existing 
mechanism that need to be kept in mind while designing 
such scheme.  
As the research on incentive mechanism in P2P 
networks are being done on wide basis, it is not 
possible to present the work of each and every 
researcher in this field of study.  
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